



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

XI.—1. *De l'Opposition dans le Gouvernement, et de la Liberté de la Presse*, par M. LE VICOMTE DE BONALD, Pair de France. Paris, 1827.

2. *Debates in the British Parliament on the Change of Ministry, and on the Battle of Navarino*. London, 1828.

3. *Manifesto of the Sublime Ottoman Porte of December 20, 1827*.

ALTHOUGH the period which has elapsed since the close of the last general war, is commonly spoken of as a season of tranquillity, and may be justly viewed as such when compared with the five and twenty years immediately preceding, it has nevertheless been filled up by an almost uninterrupted series of important events. The foundation of a numerous brotherhood of new nations in Spanish and Portuguese America, the establishment of representative governments in various parts of the continent of Europe, the four military revolutions in the Italian and Spanish Peninsulas, and finally the desperate and glorious struggle for national existence in Greece, are occurrences hardly inferior, in permanent interest and actual importance, to those which constituted the successive stages of the French Revolution. Of these great political movements some have already nearly reached, in one way or another, their natural termination, and have ceased in consequence to attract, so strongly as before, the attention of the world. Notwithstanding the fatal dissensions that have lately distracted the councils of some of our sister Republics of the South, and the clouds that overshadow to a certain extent their immediate future prospects, we cannot permit ourselves to doubt for a moment, that the independence and freedom of the whole of Spanish America are substantially secure ; and we are firmly persuaded that this grand consummation will open a new and most auspicious chapter in the history of human affairs. On the other hand, the temporary triumph of liberal principles in several quarters of the south of Europe, which was attended from the beginning with many ominous and unsatisfactory circumstances, was soon succeeded by such decisive reverses, as to leave for the moment, in that quarter, no farther ground of hope. But while the general interest in these two courses of events has been thus diminished by success on the one hand, and by failure on the

other, the establishment and progress of representative government on the Continent, and the war of Independence in Greece, continue to offer from year to year new incidents of constantly augmenting importance. The last few months in particular have been marked in both by occurrences of signal moment. The sea-fight of Navarino, if its influence on the fortunes of the Turkish Empire should at all correspond with present probabilities, can hardly fail to form an epoch in the history of the Christian world in general, as well as in that of the Greek Revolution; while the late dissolution of the French House of Deputies, followed by the unexpected triumph of liberal principles at the elections, and a consequent change of ministry, is perhaps the most curious incident that has yet occurred in the operation of the new representative constitutions of the continent. Either of these events, considered in all its details and consequences, would furnish ample materials for a long article, and might be separately treated without inconvenience. But at this distance from the scene of action, the public curiosity does not require, perhaps, so copious a supply of particulars, or so minute an investigation of their character and results, as might be suitable elsewhere; and when political events of this magnitude, though not in themselves directly connected, proceed from and exercise their influence upon a cluster of neighboring powers, so closely united by relations of every kind, as those which make up the European commonwealth, it is in some respects convenient and advantageous to review them together. We accordingly propose in this article to survey, in the very rapid and imperfect manner, which only our limited resources and space will allow, the present aspect of the general politics of Europe, and shall digest our remarks under the two leading heads which we have already specified. The fluctuations and changes which have successively occurred in the British ministry, since the retirement of Lord Liverpool, although highly important, as well from the immense interests immediately affected by every movement in the main spring of so vast a machine, as from the high celebrity of many of the names that appear in these transactions, are nevertheless not likely, we think, to produce any very material effects, either on the internal condition or foreign relations of the country. It would however be improper to leave them entirely out of view on the present occasion, and before we proceed to examine the other two subjects, alluded to above, we shall briefly con-

sider the causes and character of these changes, principally for the purpose of establishing the correctness of the remark we have just made upon their comparative indifference to the general politics of Europe and the world.

1. A change in the persons administering the government of a country, although always a thing of considerable moment, on account of the different shades of opinion and feeling under which similar principles may be professed, and the different degrees of ability with which they may be practised upon, rarely possesses a paramount interest, except when it indicates the triumph of a party or opinion. The late successive changes in the administration of the British government do not appear to be of this latter character, and even approach less nearly to it than many similar movements have done at other periods. In reality the form of that government and the general principles of policy upon which it is administered, are so well established by the experience of a century and a half, which have elapsed since the close of the civil wars, that there is little or no difference of sentiment about them in the minds of intelligent men. The nominal parties of *Whigs* and *Tories*, into which the well informed and substantial part of the community is divided, are little more than shadows of the two violent factions, whose embittered and bloody struggles formerly distracted the kingdom, and are now separated by almost imperceptible lines of distinction ; while the third party of *Radicals*, whose doctrines are no doubt sufficiently at variance with those of the two others, and whose triumph would be the signal for a domestic revolution similar to that of France, is not yet powerful enough to affect in any way the march of the government, still less to claim a direct share in the administration. Any change therefore which could well take place at present, in the *personnel* of the British ministry, would hardly be of a nature to alter materially the course of its general policy.

But the late successive new arrangements are, as we just remarked, less likely to have this effect, than many preceding ones of a similar kind ; since they have all been formed upon the avowed principle of a union of parties, and a representation in the cabinet of all the various groupes and *coteries*, which compose the ruling aristocracy. Although the cabinet of Mr Canning contained a large infusion of whig materials, he was doubtless himself its inspiring soul and actual head, and continued to be, as he had hitherto been, a professed tory. The

short lived administration of Lord Goderich was a mere continuation, on the smaller scale allowed by his Lordship's inferior talents and feebler character, of that of Mr Canning. The late recomposition of the government by the Duke of Wellington, has no doubt been effected under an influence somewhat less friendly to the whigs, than the one which prevailed immediately before ; and the more tenacious and sensitive leaders of that party have again retired to the opposition benches. But the cabinet nevertheless maintains its coloring of impartiality, comprehending the most effective members of the two that preceded it, particularly Mr Huskisson and Lord Dudley ; and has publicly pledged itself before the country and the world to pursue, on all material points, the policy of Mr Canning. It is evident therefore that the new arrangements, considered as a change of ministry, can have no very material or decisive results. Mr Peel may be somewhat less successful in calling forth alternately the smiles and tears of the faithful commons, than his brilliant predecessor ; while, on the other hand, the name of the conqueror of Waterloo, standing at the head of the government, will carry with it into the cabinets of all the continental powers far more weight, than the quiet appellations of Jenkinson or Liverpool. But the ordinary train of affairs, both foreign and domestic, will pursue substantially its former course. On the three great questions of internal policy, the finances, the corn laws, and concessions to the Catholics, there is no probability of any change. In the foreign relations, which consist at this moment in like manner of three principal branches, Spanish America, Portugal, and Turkey, the system of Mr Canning will doubtless be sustained with undiminished firmness, as respects the two first ; and should there be, as is not improbable, some variation from it in the third, it will not be the effect (rather one of the causes) of the last ministerial change, but in the main the result of unexpected events occurring abroad, which would have produced nearly the same operation upon the councils of the British cabinet under any minister. The extent and effects of this probable variation will come more naturally under our review, when we treat directly of the Greek question, in a subsequent part of this article.

The late movements in the British administration may therefore be viewed on the whole as of little importance to the general political system. They were occasioned by merely accidental causes, the attack of disease that prostrated Lord

Liverpool, and the death of Mr Canning ; and they do not indicate any change of policy in regard to the great interests of the country. When such changes do in fact take place under a government so strongly controlled by public opinion as that of England, they can have but little connexion with the caprice, or even the personal character and talent of individual statesmen, but must be owing to some corresponding change in the actual situation of the political world at home or abroad. The form and opportunity of particular measures may vary with the various tastes and powers of different ministers, which may produce in this way results of considerable importance ; but the great ends (to reverse the illustration of Shakspeare) are in the main 'rough hewn by the Divinity,' who only leaves it to his mortal ministers to affect, in some slight degree, their shape and color.

A revolution of an essential kind, in the policy of the British government, has actually taken place since the close of the late wars ; and the circumstances which occasioned it, as well as the manner in which it has steadily developed itself under the numerous and often abrupt and unexpected changes in the administration, singularly illustrate the correctness of the above remark in both its parts ; and show at once the degree to which the general policy of the kingdom is controlled by changes in the state of the political world, and the trifling extent to which the measures dictated by such changes are modified by the personal character of individual statesmen. We allude here, as the reader will of course perceive, to the retirement of Great Britain from the great despotic alliance of the Continent of Europe, and her adhesion to the liberal system which happily flourishes throughout our own. This revolution, however important, was not the result of a change of ministry ; nor has it been the occasion of any one of the successive changes of this description which have taken place since it has been in progress. Great Britain, with a constitution founded substantially on free principles, had been led by circumstances, partly accidental, to engage with ardor and activity in a coalition, whose indirect results at least were adverse to liberty. The terror inspired by a common danger, real or supposed, first from the excesses of the French revolution, and afterwards from the military ambition of Napoleon, gave rise to this unnatural connexion, and sustained it firmly as long as the danger lasted. But when the repeated conquest of France by the

allies had completely dispelled all remaining apprehensions from that quarter, the coalition virtually ceased of itself, with the cause that created it. The parties naturally pursued on subsequent occasions the course of policy conformable to their habitual principles of administration ; and as these were of a directly opposite description, they were brought, almost immediately, out of a relation of close and intimate coöperation, into one of direct hostility. Even before the battle of Waterloo, the first symptoms of this divergence appeared in the dissensions among the great powers at the congress of Vienna, and in the refusal of the British government to adhere to the holy alliance. It became still more manifest when that government declined to assist at the several anti-constitutional congresses of the continent, and even protested directly against their proceedings. Still however there was no change of ministry. Lord Londonderry, though as fully pledged by his known principles and his previous course of life to the former system as almost any man in England, felt no difficulty, under the change of circumstances which had since occurred, in acting on another of a directly opposite character ; and we now saw this sworn friend and confidential ally of legitimacy wielding his inoffensive pen (no longer backed by the thunders of Wellington and Nelson) in the cause of freedom.

In the meantime, a change of ministry produced by an accidental cause in fact occurred, and brought to the direction of the foreign affairs a statesman still more deeply pledged than Lord Londonderry to the anti-jacobin policy, and remarkable for an energy of character and a superiority of talent, which exempted him more than most persons from the control of circumstances, and rendered him in an uncommon degree the independent master of his own conduct. The personal relations of Mr Canning with his predecessor were also such, as did not naturally impose upon him any very strong obligation to follow the course which the latter had marked out. This therefore was a crisis in which we might have expected to witness the triumph of the force of individual character over that of circumstances ; and it was now, if ever, that the world might have looked for a return to the anti-revolutionary system. What in fact happened ? The energy and talent of Mr Canning served only to precipitate the change of policy which had been commenced by Lord Londonderry, and to brush away, without ceremony, the minor difficulties, which that more scrupulous or timid statesman

might have found insurmountable. We saw this ancient champion of the altar and the throne sanctioning by one of his earliest acts the revolt of the Spanish colonies, calling, in his own phrase, a new world into existence, and in the face of the rooted prejudices of his countrymen, publicly professing, with a sort of affectation, a community of system and feeling with these United States.

Another accident again unsettles the ministry, raises Mr Canning to the head of the government, and gives him the free choice of his associates. Now at least, if we suppose him to have been shackled before by the authority or judgment of others, was a golden opportunity for indulging his favorite prejudices, shifting at once the helm of state, and returning to the old course, given out in better days by 'the pilot that weathered the storm.' What, again we ask, was the result? The cherished nursling and fond admirer of Pitt fills his cabinet with avowed and veteran whigs of the school of Fox, and even carries his liberality so far, as to make himself the object of the bitter personal animosity of the principal surviving disciples of his ancient master. The *Coryphaeus* of anti-jacobins, who had cheered on in poetry and prose, for twenty years together, a general European crusade against revolution, now declares in open parliament before the face of Europe, that he is ready, if circumstances require, to take the field a second time on the other side, and to head the revolutionary troops on a crusade, as long and as bloody as the former one against legitimacy. Finally the last act of his life was to conclude, under the form of a treaty of alliance with Russia and France, for the pacification of Greece, a compact with the latter power, for the real purpose, as we shall show hereafter, of embarrassing the policy of Russia herself, of Russia, the long tried, faithful, and invaluable coadjutor of the Pitt-statesmen, in their struggle with Napoleon. Such then is the influence of circumstances over the conduct of a British minister, and so little are his measures dependent upon his own peculiar views and character. If his temper be quiet and feeble, he pursues without a struggle the onward current of events. If, on the contrary, he have anything of a 'tyrant's vein' about him, any disposition (of which the late premier certainly had a good deal) to 'make all split,' he only abounds the more fully in the same sense, and overleaps with the less difficulty all minor scruples.

The principles we have here stated are sufficiently evident, and have their application to a greater or less extent in most other governments ; but they are so curiously illustrated and corroborated by the history of that of England, for the last fifteen years, that we have been led insensibly into a fuller recapitulation of details, than was absolutely necessary to the course of the present inquiry. We repeat however, that the late ministerial changes in England are not of a nature to produce, as such, any material effects upon general politics. It does not belong to our present purpose to examine them much in detail under other points of view. Of the three complete revolutions that have taken place within the last two years, the two first were occasioned, as we have remarked above, by events entirely casual. The real causes of the dissolution of the Goderich administration are less apparent, and after the ample explanations given on all sides of both houses of Parliament, are still, to a certain extent, enveloped in mystery. The trifling misunderstanding between Mr Huskisson and Mr Herries, respecting the person who should fill the chair of a Committee of Finance, does not appear to us a circumstance of sufficient importance to have produced this effect, although we are well aware that little things become great, when they affect great interests. It is not impossible to reconcile the positive assertion of Lord Goderich and other members of the late administration, that this misunderstanding was the actual and only cause of its dissolution, with the supposition that other and more weighty difficulties had created in his Lordship's mind an inclination to retire, without which the small matter in question might have been got over. A powerful party in the aristocracy continued to exhibit a menacing aspect, and Lord Goderich, a sensitive and gentle rather than commanding character, may have felt that he had not the casque of three fold brass, which armed the dauntless front of his lamented friend and predecessor, wherewith to stem its fury. On the other hand, affairs had taken a somewhat unfavorable turn in Turkey, and another general war, if not probable, was at least within the compass of no very distant possibility. Lord Goderich may not have chosen to encounter this hazard, from which indeed a stouter heart than his appears to be, might well recoil with consternation. In the apprehension of these impending storms, he may have preferred to resign at once, before the arrival of the moment of actual danger, when it would no longer be possible to quit his post with honor ; and on

that account may have attached an importance to the affair of the Finance Committee, which he would not have given to it under other circumstances ; while this, being the only motive for his retirement which he mentioned to the King, may have been spoken of with technical propriety as its real moving cause. This view of the subject is the more probable, since we must look for this cause, in circumstances likely to operate precisely on his Lordship's own mind, as he appears to have resigned, not only without consulting with his colleagues, but even without apprising them of his intention. Mr Tierney declared in the house of Commons, that he supposed the government to be going on as usual, twenty-four hours after the head of it had quitted the helm. We cannot however enter any further at present into this discussion.

The new administration seems to us to wear an aspect of firmer consistency and greater durability, than either of the two preceding ones. We consider Mr Peel as the effective Prime Minister. The Duke of Wellington, though perhaps less incapable of conducting the civil affairs of the kingdom, than he is supposed to be by many, and than his noble frankness and genuine modesty have induced him to represent himself, does not appear to be regarded by his countrymen, as the precise person best fitted for the post he now fills ; and from intimations which he has given in the house of lords, as well as from the nature of the arrangements which have been made for supplying his place at the head of the army, it is not unlikely that he intends at no very distant period to return to this latter station. In that case Mr Peel may probably be called to succeed him, and to assume the ostensible direction of the government. Of the character and talents of this statesman we entertain a very favorable opinion. He has not perhaps the brilliant elocution, the ready wit, the rich stores of polite literature, and the fine poetical taste, which gave Mr Canning so powerful a sway over the house ; but we are not sure that, even as a parliamentary speaker, he is not really equal or superior to his great predecessor. He has more discretion, more familiarity with matters of mere business, and, we incline to believe, more precision and correctness in his habits of thinking. These are solid qualities, which cannot but secure, in the end, the confidence of the nation to a greater extent than mere rhetoric. Mr Peel is however by no means defective in manner as an orator. He possesses, on the contrary, a copious,

manly, and unaffected style of elocution, highly appropriate to the subjects he is called to treat, and graced perhaps with as much ornament as good taste would admit. The mixture of firmness and moderation exhibited in his conduct on the occasion of the forming of the Canning ministry, whether he be right or wrong on the Catholic question, was creditable to his moral character, which is also, we understand, in all respects unexceptionable. He is now in the flower of life, possessed of every accidental advantage, and at the opening of a public career which promises, we think, to be highly honorable to himself, and useful to his country.

2. The late changes in the administration of the French government, to which we next propose to direct our attention, are different in character, and much more important to the general politics of Europe, than those which we have just been considering. France seems to be almost the only country where the great political parties which divide to a certain extent, and under different shapes and names, the whole christian world, are actually in presence of each other, and carry on the war with activity and vigor. In the military monarchies of the East of Europe, and, as at present constituted, in the two Peninsulas, the *liberal* opinion is crushed into silence by main force, and has no public expression. In Great Britain and in all parts of our own Continent, the *legitimate* opinion, if it in fact exist at all, is too feebly sustained by the public sentiment, to form the avowed creed of any considerable party; and the political controversies that are carried on from time to time, with more or less warmth, turn, for the most part, in England, on the merits of particular measures, and with us, where the field is still more narrow, on the characters of individuals. In France, on the contrary, the two opinions are pretty nearly balanced; for if the liberal party have, as we incline to think, a decided superiority of force in the nation, their legitimate opponents are, on the other hand, backed by a powerful foreign influence, which can never be entirely overlooked in a kingdom having an immense open frontier. This reinforcement enables the party to keep the field, and has even given them, for a considerable portion of the period subsequent to the restoration, an appearance of success, and at times a complete and undisputed predominance. The respective opinions and objects of these two parties are sufficiently familiar to our readers. They are determined in general by the great changes in the state of civ-

ilization and society which have led to the division ; although the views of the individuals engaged in the controversy at particular times and places, often vary very much from the common standard, and are not always fully realized by themselves ; for in practical life, the influence of impulse and passion is not less powerful than that of principle, or even interest. Since the revolution in France, the struggle has been immediately for the administration of the government. It has been kept up steadily under several successive alternations of triumph and defeat ; but the recent victory of the opposition seems to be more complete and decisive than any preceding one of either party. A rapid review of the political history of France during the period in question, will serve perhaps to explain the circumstances which have led to this result, and to throw some light on its probable consequences.

The first demonstration of public opinion that was exhibited after the king's second return, seemed to indicate a clear superiority of force on the anti-constitutional side. We allude to the election of the house of deputies of 1815, called by Louis XVIII. the *chambre introuvable*, and which was composed almost wholly of returned emigrants. By what species of management or accident this result was effected, is a point that has never been precisely explained ; but it was pretty soon apparent that the majority of the house were much better royalists than the people, or even than the king. The king may in fact be viewed as having been himself from early life, and from personal conviction and feeling, an adherent of the liberal party ; a fact which has probably had more weight than any other single circumstance, in regulating the course of events since the restoration, and determining the present state and future destinies of France. The concession of the charter was the first great and unequivocal proof which he gave of his intentions ; and after his return from Ghent, his disposition on these subjects was soon exhibited in other not less certain forms. The ministers whom he chiefly favored and trusted, particularly M. de Cases, were known to be decidedly liberal ; and the dissolution by a special ordinance of the *chambre introuvable*, the year after its formation, was a sufficiently significant rebuke of the spirit which prevailed in its deliberations. For the three or four years intervening between this period and the assassination of the Duke of Berry, liberalism was undoubtedly the order of the day, and was understood to be constantly gaining ground

both at court and in the country. This was a turn of affairs which the royalists could not at all comprehend, and still less acquiesce in with a good grace. Considering the entire history of the last thirty years to be fairly expressed by the single word *revolution*, a word which, in the Scripture phrase, was not even to be named among christians; they look upon the king's whole course of proceedings, including the concession of the charter, as a sort of inexplicable mystery, a kind of desperate and fatal somnambulism, which they could hardly imagine possible, but from which, as it had really occurred, it was their bounden and sacred duty to rouse their sovereign, for his own good as well as theirs. They accordingly commenced in the two houses, and through the channel of the press, a most violent attack, which they carried on with undiminished zeal for three or four years, upon liberal, or as they called them, revolutionary principles. The leader of the party in the house of Deputies, where the struggle was more active than in that of Peers, was M. de Villèle. The daily newspapers being subject to a censorship, the great engines in the written controversy were periodical and other pamphlets, the most remarkable of which was the *Conservateur*, or *Preserver*, a sort of journal published in numbers of thirty or forty pages each, at irregular periods, but on an average about once a fortnight, under the direction of the Viscount de Châteaubriand, assisted by a considerable number of friends and associates. Such was the original position in the political field of these two statesmen, then in the strictest bonds of alliance, whose coöperation, assisted in some degree by accidents, effected after a while the triumph of the royalist party, and whose subsequent division has been the main cause of its late discomfiture, and perhaps final and irreparable overthrow.

Although M. de Châteaubriand, whose name is familiar to our readers as that of one of the most distinguished literary characters of the day, be undoubtedly much superior in original talent and liberal accomplishment to M. de Villèle, the latter appears, notwithstanding, to have been recognised, at this time and ever since, as the effective leader of the royalist party, while the other was looked upon merely as a powerful champion and coadjutor in the common cause. The general acquiescence which was given to this arrangement by all except the brilliant author of the *Genius of Christianity* himself, may induce us to suppose, that it was not adopted without good

reasons ; but if we form an opinion of the character of M. de Villèle merely upon such grounds as are open to the public, it is not easy to discover the precise qualities which have entitled him to this distinction, or in fact to the degree of confidence which he seems to have enjoyed among his political friends. He certainly possesses none of those gifts and graces which captivate the imagination, and are generally necessary, at least to a certain extent, to secure the popular favor. Though copious and ready as a parliamentary orator, a distinction much more rare in France than in England or the United States, his manner is altogether plain and even ungraceful, and his speeches give little or no evidence of extraordinary depth or sagacity of thought. It would seem therefore, that his great superiority, if real, must consist in practical ability and sound discretion in the management of delicate affairs. The combination of these useful qualities with a decided natural talent, though of daily occurrence in cooler climates, is somewhat less common, and of course more valuable, in France ; and the confidence entertained by the royalists, that it formed the basis of the character of M. de Villèle, was, we incline to think, the real ground, certainly a very just and proper one, of the high estimation in which they held him. Whether his administration has fully justified this confidence, is perhaps a doubtful question. As far as we can judge of it at this distance, it exhibits no very decided demonstrations either of practical talent or of extraordinary discretion. His course in regard to the Spanish war, the most important of his measures, was not only liable to strong, substantial objections, but was throughout vacillating and uncertain in a very singular degree ; and his previous declaration in the house of deputies, on that occasion, ‘that if he did not make war at the South he should have it at the North,’ was certainly anything but discreet. The abrupt and passionate manner in which he broke with M. de Châteaubriand (supposing him even, as we incline to do, to have been in the right on the merits of the quarrel) was not very honorable to his coolness and prudence. Finally the measures by which he brought on the late crisis, and to which we shall presently advert, as they were wholly uncalled for by any pressing emergency, and, instead of strengthening his hands, as he expected, have led to his own ruin and that of his party, have been shown by the event to have been in the highest degree impolitic and

ill judged. Making every allowance for the difficulty of the times, which yet does not seem to have been excessive, we cannot therefore recognise in his conduct any striking appearances of judicious, practical statesmanship. His warmest admirers would certainly never dream of classing him with the greatest names in this line, the Richelieus and Ximeneses of other times, or the Pitts and Metternichs of our own. We cannot indeed but think, that even his friends must have been disappointed in him, and that his measures can hardly have realised the expectation they had founded on his supposed consummate prudence and address.

We may add, that while his natural genius seems to have been by no means of an elevated order, his education was also not exactly of the kind most likely to furnish him with the proper accomplishments and talents of a statesman. He had served in the navy from his earliest youth until the opening of the revolution; and at that time had taken refuge with some of his personal friends in a remote colony in the East Indies, where he continued to reside, until the quiet of the country was completely restored by Napoleon. He returned to France in 1807, and took up his abode in his native city of Toulouse, where he lived in complete seclusion from political affairs until the restoration. His opinions were, however, very well known, and he lost no time in fully avowing them in a pamphlet which he published in 1814, in opposition to the concession of the charter. He was elected the next year to the *chambre introuvable*, where he immediately distinguished himself among the very few extemporary speakers in the house, and was soon recognised, by general consent, as the royalist leader. The complete independence which he had maintained of all the preceding governments, although it did not increase his capacity for conducting the affairs of the state, probably contributed to establish his fame for purity of principle; while the modest and unassuming virtues which distinguished his private character, conciliated the esteem and affection of all who knew him. After all, the actual scarcity at this moment of persons, at once entirely uncommitted to the revolution, and well fitted in all other respects for political life, was doubtless among the principal causes that raised M. de Villèle so suddenly into notice and distinction among his political friends. This circumstance, however, did not entitle him to the preëminence over M. de Châteaubriand, who had been already known for years pre-

ceding, through evil and good report, as an uncompromising adherent of the Bourbon cause, and who had rendered with his pen the most essential services to the principles upon which its success was supposed to rest.

The Viscount de Châteaubriand undoubtedly possesses an intellect not only much superior to that of M. de Villèle, but absolutely of the highest order ; and from the eminence which he has attained, both in the literary and political career, may be fairly reckoned among the most distinguished individuals of our times. He has courted in turn, with equal fervor and nearly equal success, the three sister muses of Poetry, Philosophy, and History, who, according to the scheme of Lord Bacon, divide between them the dominion of the world of letters ; and has entered with ardor, as a leading character, into all the political struggles of the eventful period in which he has lived. In early youth he seems to have labored, as it were, under an exuberance of life and talent, which overflowed in the most impracticable and extravagant projects both in action and in literature. Descended from one of the old, noble families, and holding a commission in the king's service, he embarked for this country at the age of three or four and twenty, with the double purpose of discovering the northwest passage, and collecting materials for an epic poem in prose, on the manners and history of the Indians. The first of these promising enterprises seems to have failed at the outset. In preparing to execute the other, he travelled far and wide over all parts of this continent, and finally digested his observations into a work called the *Natchez*, a sort of romance founded on the historical event of the massacre of the French colony of that name by the neighboring tribes, and in which the novels of *Atala* and *René*, since published in a separate form, were originally inserted as episodes. Circumstances prevented the author from finishing this work ; and we are rather surprised, that his mature judgment should not have induced him to suppress it entirely. In the mean time, however, while he was engaged in these interesting philosophical and literary pursuits, the revolution opened with the emigration of the princes and most of the nobility. M. de Châteaubriand felt himself bound in honor to share the fortunes of his order, and, abandoning at once the northwest passage and the *Natchez*, embarked for England, and immediately enlisted in the army of Condé. With this high spirited but ill starred little corps, he appears to have seen much hard

service, and to have encountered many dangers and hair breadth 'scapes. On its final dissolution he retired to London, and lived for some years, like most of his brother emigrants, in an obscure and penurious condition, subsisting precariously on French translation, and employing his leisure in the composition of an *Essay on Revolutions*. This treatise, of which the first part was published at the time, and which has lately been reprinted in a complete edition of the author's works, is a curious specimen of the wild extravagance of youthful genius, full of life and power, but not yet taught or tamed by wholesome experience, bursting with imaginary stores of intellectual wealth, and, that no time may be lost in communicating them, despatching with a few dashes of the pen an encyclopedia of the greatest questions in politics, morals, and literature. The plan of the work is essentially vicious, and the details extravagant often to absurdity. It also abounds in false principles, and, to a less extent, in marks of false taste in style; and it is written throughout in an amusing tone of self-sufficiency and dogmatism. That a person capable of producing such a work should be compelled, by any chance, to vegetate unknown and unthought of in a garret, was, of course, in his opinion, a fact sufficient of itself to demonstrate the utter rottenness of the existing condition of society, which he accordingly qualifies in no very favorable terms. 'I figure to myself the world,' he remarks, in one of the passages in which he treats this subject, 'I figure to myself the world as a vast forest, and the human race as a band of robbers, who lie in wait in it, to rob and murder each other.' A charming illustration of the principles and forms of social intercourse! But with all its defects, the style and substance of the *Essay* argue powers of the highest order, and extensive research through the whole field of knowledge. In the late new edition of it, the author has accompanied the text with a commentary, in which he candidly avows, and often ridicules, with great good humor, the faults to which we have alluded.

We mention these particulars in the early life of M. de Châteaubriand, rather as being in themselves of a curious and amusing description, than as tending to illustrate his mature character, which, if estimated by them, would certainly be far from deserving, in any respect, the opinion we have given of it. The youthful sallies of superior minds are generally extravagant in proportion to the extraordinary vigor and efficiency of

their riper efforts. With the return of M. de Châteaubriand to France, about the year 1800, a new era commenced in his political and literary conduct. Among the wanton and thoughtless passages in the *Essay on Revolutions*, were some that alluded disrespectfully to religion. These of course gave great pain to his family; and his mother on her death-bed had sent him a solemn admonition on the subject through his sister, who also died before the letter, in which she conveyed it, reached her hands. The deep impression, naturally produced by such a concurrence of circumstances on a sensitive and ardent constitution, turned at once the current of his thoughts and feelings in an opposite direction; and for many years after it seems to have been his principal object to make an honorable reparation for his former faults, and to counteract, as far as possible, the effect they might have had on the minds of others. For this purpose he undertook, and two or three years after published, his principal work, entitled the *Genius of Christianity*, which met with a high degree of public favor, and on which his purely literary fame is mainly founded. Its character is rather poetical than philosophical; and it was doubtless on this account so much the better fitted to effect its object. Its popularity was much increased by the insertion, in the body of it, of the tales entitled *Atala* and *René*, originally intended as episodes in the romance of the *Natchez*. Considered as works of art, these novels are perhaps conceived on false principles of taste, and are not unexceptionable even in a moral point of view; but they both display great power of execution, and they recommended the work to a class of readers, for whom it would otherwise have had less attraction.

The opinion of competent judges has been a good deal divided, respecting the literary character of the *Genius of Christianity*; but we incline to believe, that it will be viewed hereafter as one of the remarkable productions of the age. It possesses indeed the singular merit of being the only defence of our religion yet published, which has had an extensive vogue as a merely literary work, independently of its substantial or scientific value. It has also the advantage of being in a great measure clear of controversial topics, and consequently nearly equally interesting to Christians of all denominations. But whatever its positive merit may be, it certainly produced, from the peculiar circumstances under which it was published, a greater and happier effect, than almost any book of modern times. It was one

of the most powerful, immediate agents in counteracting the current of opinion, that had set so strongly in France for many years preceding, in favor of loose doctrines in religion and morals. One or two brilliant pens commonly set the fashion of the day in letters, and when so popular a writer came forward, as the champion of good principles, the minor wits were ashamed to scoff, and the crowd of imitators followed of course in the new direction. After running the gauntlet through a pretty severe course of abuse and ridicule, the work finally obtained a decided victory ; and it is from this period, that we may perhaps date with precision the revived respect for religion, which forms the most pleasing feature in the present moral aspect of the French people. The glory of having contributed so much to this result, is undoubtedly far superior to any merely literary or political distinction ; and we have sometimes regretted, that the pen, which had been sanctified as it were by such success in so holy a cause, should have ever after been devoted to merely worldly topics.

The immense importance to the state of the service thus rendered to the church, could not be overlooked by any who entertained just notions of the nature of the relation between religion and government. Even Bonaparte, with his exclusively military tastes and habits, was not so insensible to moral considerations, as to view it with indifference. He immediately appointed M. de Châteaubriand, secretary to his embassy at Rome, then filled by Cardinal Fesch, and soon after, his minister plenipotentiary to the republic of the Valais. The leisure afforded by these situations was devoted to the composition of another work, called the *Martyrs*, intended to promote the same general object as the *Genius of Christianity*, but which, although it contains many beautiful passages, is on the whole, we think, a less fortunate effort. Upon the execution of the Duke d'Enghien, he threw up his place in disgust, and retired entirely from political life. Soon after this, he made a rapid tour through Greece, Palestine, and Egypt, for the purpose of viewing, with his own eyes, the places in which he had laid the scene of the *Martyrs*, and enabling himself, in this way, to give his descriptions additional truth and vivacity. After his return from this expedition, he resided in Paris, until the fall of Bonaparte, chiefly occupied in finishing and publishing, first the work just alluded to, and afterwards an account of his travels, under the

title of an *Itinerary from Paris to Jerusalem*. This production is essentially a poem like the other, and, we think, the finer one of the two. Some passages in the *Martyrs* were supposed to allude indirectly to Napoleon; and the latter, in revenge, as we are told by M. de Châteaubriand, ordered one of his cousins, who was then a state prisoner, to immediate execution.

We shall not, we trust, be considered as giving a disproportionate importance to M. de Châteaubriand, by entering upon this somewhat protracted detail of the events of his life, when it is recollected, that he has been perhaps the most active politician in France since the revolution, and that his influence has been exerted decisively in the late ministerial changes, which form at present our immediate subject. The return of the Bourbons gave a new direction to his literary talent, which has since been exclusively and indefatigably employed on political topics. He announced and welcomed the new order of events in a powerful pamphlet, which had the effect of recommending to the affection of the people their almost forgotten, legitimate monarch. Upon Bonaparte's return from Elba, he accompanied the king to Ghent, and acted there as his principal minister. The ascendancy acquired by the liberal party, soon after the second restoration of Louis the Eighth, to which we have already alluded, threw him, with the other determined royalists, into the ranks of opposition. The first fruit of his efforts, under these new circumstances, was the work entitled the *Monarchy according to the Charter*, the largest and most elaborate of his mature political essays, in which he first analyzes the nature of representative government in general, and then examines and endeavors to invalidate the grounds on which the adoption of a liberal system of administration by the king was commonly defended. With all the respect which we feel for the intellect of M. de Châteaubriand, we conceive that it is essentially a poetical, and not a philosophical one; and that his talent lies in expressing his opinions, whatever they may be, in powerful and beautiful language, rather than in forming them with extraordinary sagacity, coolness, and precision. We find him indeed adopting, at different times, with equally apparent and, we doubt not, real conviction, the most opposite theories in religion and politics, and expressing them both with the same force and fervor, without always deeming it necessary to account distinctly for the change. Hence the charge of inconsis-

tency, which has been urged against him with considerable plausibility, and to which we shall advert more particularly hereafter.

The *Monarchy according to the Charter* does not, in our opinion, in its purely theoretical part, exhaust the great question of representative government, or even furnish any decidedly original and striking views on the subject. It is rarely indeed, if ever, that there is any real value in discussions of general principles, brought forward in the heat of controversy, for the purpose of effecting the decision of points in dispute between political parties. In the work now alluded to, there were two or three passages which the ministers affected to consider as personally disrespectful to the king, and under this pretence they struck off the name of the author from the roll of counsellors of state. This proceeding did not tend, of course, to conciliate his feelings; and, pursuing with augmented zeal his course of opposition, he undertook, with the aid of a number of friends, the publication of the *Conservateur*, to which we have already alluded, and assumed, in conjunction with M. de Villèle, the principal direction of the royalist party.

Such were the characters of these two statesmen, and if M. de Villèle was generally acknowledged as the real leader of the party, it can hardly be denied, that M. de Châteaubriand was the person who contributed most powerfully to the attainment of the common object. It is indeed to his labors in the *Conservateur*, that the triumph of the royalists, as far as it was the effect of exertion, has been universally ascribed by friends and foes. Never before, with perhaps the single exception of the writings of Burke on the French revolution, was a political controversy sustained, through the channel of the press, with equal ability. The author is now upon his true ground. He loses no time in a cool investigation of facts or impartial settlement of philosophical principles, but takes for granted, that he is fighting the battles of God and the king, or according to the chosen motto of the work, *le Roi, la Charte, et les honnêtes gens*, against the efforts of a new incarnation of the principle of evil in the form of revolution. The vice in his reasoning lies in this assumption; but admitting his principles, the fearful conclusions which he drew from them followed of course; and being announced with such splendid and impressive eloquence, they struck terror into every heart. His articles, like every thing else that proceeds from his pen, are a series of poems, and in stern sublimity of spirit, as well as bold

imagery and rich oriental coloring of language, resemble the terrible denunciations of the ancient Hebrew prophets, rather than the petty sparring that forms the staple of common newspaper controversy. Social order, with all its dependent charities and blessings, law, morals, the sacred name of religion, every principle that good men regard as dear and valuable, is invoked to lend its aid in this holy war. Having firmly enchained his readers by the magic of his eloquence, he transports them successively to the scenes of all the horrors that disgraced the revolution; the groves of La Vendée sanctified by the blood of a host of martyrs; the violated sepulchres of Henry the Fourth and St Louis; the prisons of the reign of terror; the scaffold of Louis the Sixteenth; and finally the death-bed of the duke of Berry, from which, as a starting post, he leads on the last and most furious onset against the obnoxious favorite.

Such was the battery, which the Viscount de Châteaubriand opened upon the administration of M. de Cases and his adherents. Nothing could sustain its tremendous fire. The smaller craft of ordinary newspapers and pamphlets sunk under it like a fleet of gun-boats, under the broadside of a seventy-four. Even the *Minerve*, a very able liberal publication of the same class, conducted by such men as Constant, Etienne, Jay, and others, writers of great merit, was clearly overmastered. The ministry perceived the havoc that was making in their ranks by this merciless engine, and by extending the censorship to books and pamphlets, as well as newspapers, succeeded in reducing it to silence. But it was now too late to remedy the evil. The prodigious effect that had already been produced, aided by the imprudence of the liberalists, and by the fatal catastrophe of the duke of Berry, finally unsettled the administration, and threw it into royalist hands. The change in the public opinion of the country was not less complete. The liberal party were defeated at the following elections in all quarters, and instead of commanding, as they had done before, nearly half the votes in the house, and at times a majority, found themselves reduced in the new parliament, summoned on the accession of Charles the Tenth, to an insignificant fraction of some twelve or fourteen persons. Such were the wonders achieved, in the course of two or three years, by a single pen. The result evidently proved that, although the public taste does not always accurately estimate the nice distinctions between the personal qualities of different competitors for influence, there are some

talents of so transcendent a kind, that they cannot be overlooked, and if at all aided by circumstances, infallibly produce effect. The sequel of these occurrences affords a still more striking illustration of the same principle.

The royalists had now obtained a complete triumph, and it only remained to distribute the rewards and honors of victory. In performing this delicate task, they exhibited the same preference, whether well or ill founded, for the claims of M. de Villèle over those of M. de Châteaubriand, to which we have already alluded. Although the latter was undoubtedly superior in general ability to the former, and had proved himself a far more active and useful champion in the cause, they nevertheless continued to regard M. de Villèle as the real leader. He was accordingly placed at the head of the government, in the character of president of the council of ministers, and minister of Finance. M. de Châteaubriand was appointed ambassador at London; upon the meeting of the congress at Vienna in the course of the year following, was sent with the duke of Montmorency, then minister of foreign affairs, to represent the king on that occasion; and upon the resignation of M. de Montmorency, soon after his return from the congress, was called to take his place in the cabinet. From this time forward, the two statesmen conducted the affairs of the country as the leading members of the government. They acted together in apparent and probably in real harmony, during the critical period of the Spanish war, which immediately followed; but not long after this war was finally terminated, in the course of the summer of 1824, a breach took place between them, and to the great surprise of the public, which had little or no previous notice of their misunderstanding, M. de Châteaubriand was abruptly removed from his place, without the observation of the ordinary forms of personal civility, by a laconic and almost insulting note from the count Villèle.

A knowledge of the circumstances which were assigned as the causes of this rupture, tended to increase rather than diminish the surprise that was generally felt at its occurrence. It was natural to suppose, that these two distinguished friends and allies, who had coöperated so long and with so much activity in what they regarded as the best and holiest of causes, could have been separated only by a difference of opinion, upon some question of deep and vital interest to the monarchy. But the experience of the world, in all ages and nations, shows but

too plainly, that the merest trifles are often permitted to distract the councils and destroy the friendships of the best and greatest men. The consolation is, that the rule works with equal force the other way, and that enmities which seemed irreconcilable are often appeased and converted into lasting friendships, by the occurrence of the least momentary community of interest or feeling. In the present instance, the ostensible ground of quarrel related to a purely financial measure, unconnected with any important political question, and in itself of a transitory character. M. de Villèle had formed the project of reducing the interest on a part of the public debt, by proposing to the creditors to exchange their five per cent. stocks, for three per cents, of the same nominal amount, or to receive payment of the principal. Similar operations have been often attempted with success in England, and in the United States, and when practicable are always regarded, we believe, in both countries, as highly advantageous to the public and free from all objection. M. de Châteaubriand viewed it in a different light, and considered it as a hardship on the creditors to be compelled to make the election required by such a measure. However this may be, the question does not seem to be of a nature to create a permanent breach between the two ministers. It was wholly unconnected with the general course of politics, and having once been adopted or rejected, might never perhaps have been mentioned again in the cabinet, and could of course in no way disturb the future concert of action among its members. In opposing it in the council, M. de Châteaubriand exercised a right which could not be called in question, and we are not informed that he violated in any way the decorum of his position by attacking it publicly either in print or in the house of peers. The pretended offence, if we rightly understand the matter, was, that he did not support it in that body, but kept silence while it was under discussion. To expect a member of the cabinet not merely to vote but to speak in favor of a ministerial measure which he disapproves, is a thing unheard of in England, the great exemplar of the scheme of representative monarchy; and M. de Villèle in insisting upon this, gave but slender evidence either of his familiarity with the principles of that form of government, or of his supposed extraordinary discretion. We are tempted to believe in this case, as in that of the late dissolution of the Goderich administration, that the ostensible course, though the immediate, may not have been the only

one ; that M. de Châteaubriand may have found his position under a leader whom he doubtless considered as decidedly his inferior, habitually uneasy ; and that the sentiment naturally growing out of this situation, may have displayed itself at this particular juncture in some unguarded proceeding, of a nature to offend M. de Villèle, and to make the future coöperation of the two ministers impossible. The circumstances of their separation evidently show, that some communications of an irritating nature had passed between them ; and the bitter animosity, which M. de Châteaubriand has ever since displayed towards his ancient friend and ally, confirms the conclusion. No sooner was he ejected from the cabinet, than he threw himself, without a moment's delay, into the ranks of opposition, and commenced an attack upon the royalist administration, of which he had just formed a part, not less furious and unrelenting than that which he had before directed against the liberal one of M. de Cases ; and having kept it up with exemplary steadiness and vigor for about the same period, has had the satisfaction to see it attended with the same success. It is generally admitted that his writings have been the main cause of the change in public opinion, which led to the late recomposition of the ministry.

Under these circumstances it was difficult for M. de Châteaubriand to escape the charge of inconsistency ; and with every disposition to put the most favorable construction on his conduct, and to approve his present principles, which are more consonant with our own than his former ones, we cannot but think that the impeachment was made with some degree of justice. The opposition with which he had now connected himself, although it contained a small fraction of discontented royalists, consisted in the main of the liberal party, the very party which he had himself branded as revolutionary, and had contributed so much to drive from power. His separation from the ministry, having been occasioned by a single isolated measure, furnished no new grounds for regular and standing opposition. The disposition of the government to neutralize the liberal spirit of the charter, and especially to encourage the ascendancy of the clergy to an unconstitutional and illegal extent, were still, as before, the leading topics of attack. Although there was probably much real foundation for both these charges, it must in candor be allowed that neither of them lay with great propriety, to use the law phrase, *in the mouth* of the noble Viscount. It is true that he had always, to a certain ex-

tent, professed his approbation of the principles of representative government. His *Monarchy according to the Charter* was ostensibly a sort of exposition of what he considered the true intent and meaning of that instrument ; and even at the period of his most decided devotion to the royalist cause, when he was acting as ambassador at the congress of Vienna, he had been denounced by some of the blinder fanatics, as a well known and incorrigible *apostle of constitutions*. It must however be recollected, that, in countries where a representative government is established by law, every person who takes part in political affairs, must of course assume the expediency of such an institution, whatever may be at bottom his real opinion. The only possible difference that can exist in such a case between active parties, is that of construing the spirit and form of the government more or less favorably to the rights of the king on the one hand, or of the people on the other. Within the limits allowed by the constitution, M. de Châteaubriand had heretofore distinguished himself as the most determined champion of majesty, and the most inveterate foe of liberalism. Could he now with perfect consistency join the ranks of a party, which was constantly urging to the full extent of their constitutional limits, often, as the ministers affirmed, a great deal further, the rights and pretensions of the people in opposition to the royal prerogative ?

On the other topic the charge was perhaps still more fully substantiated. The disposition of the ministry to encourage the ascendancy of the clergy was no doubt apparent, and it was also incontestible that the forms under which this was done were not always strictly legal. The Jesuits had been formally prohibited in France, and the prohibition, though of ancient date, had never been repealed. As the unpopularity of the order was infinitely greater than before the revolution, the attempt to restore it was on every account decidedly impolitic ; but if made at all, it could only have been done with constitutional propriety, by enacting a new law upon the subject. Aware that such a proposition would shock too directly the opinion of the country ; and incapable, as it seems, of resisting, on the other hand, the urgency of the solicitations in favor of the Jesuits, who were probably sustained in a quarter of very high authority, the government permitted this celebrated *company* to establish their colleges, in defiance of the letter of the law, as well as of the almost universal feeling of all

classes of the people. When called on to defend these proceedings at the tribune of the chambers, the ministers could only answer with shifts and evasions, obviously insufficient in themselves, and which of course tended to create the suspicion that more was meant than met the ear. The conduct of the government was the more impolitic, in as much as there was at the time a strong and active party among the clergy, comprehending most of the young and ardent members of the body, and headed by the well known Abbé de la Mennais, who were constantly proclaiming, with a fiery and fanatical zeal, almost amounting to fury, doctrines entirely subversive of the cherished liberties of the Gallican church, and even of the temporal authority of the sovereign. These doctrines were publicly disavowed by the ministry ; but while there appeared any reasonable ground for suspicion in their own conduct, it was not unnatural to consider them as guided in secret by the same views. On this subject therefore they were fairly open to attack, and it was doubtless at this weak point in their defence, that the breach was finally made. But was it for the author of the genius of christianity to denounce in bitter terms the dangers of the growing ascendancy in religion ? Did it belong to the eloquent apologist of the monastic orders in general, including particularly the Jesuits, as the most remarkable among the number, to raise the alarm at the toleration of the *company* in France ? It was hardly possible not to apply in this case the *Quis tulerit Gracchos* ? and although, as we have remarked, we consider the apprehensions that were entertained on this head as justly founded, we cannot but think that M. de Châteaubriand was the last man in France, who ought to have taken upon himself to express them. To do him justice, we believe, as far as we have had an opportunity to observe the progress of the controversy, that he has not individually so strongly insisted on this topic, as on the other of the generally illiberal and unconstitutional tendency of the ministry. The task of denouncing the Jesuits was principally executed by the avowedly liberal party ; and as far as the royalists joined in it, fell into the hands of the Count de Montlosier, another seceder from the common standard, who, at the age of nearly four score, displays all the activity and vivacity of a young combatant on his first campaign, and who has done more than any other person to direct the public attention to this particular point ; not without some little sacrifice on his part too of consistency ; for in his earlier writings,

during his emigration, he had insisted greatly on the importance of reëstablishing the church, and had even conceived the not wholly anti-monastic project of invading France at the head of an army of Capuchin friars, for the purpose of crushing the revolution and re-conquering the throne of the Bourbons.

But whatever may be thought of the consistency of M. de Châteaubriand, a somewhat delicate question, in regard to the conduct of most practical statesmen, the event has shown, that his aid, wherever given, was by no means a matter of indifference. The royalists found to their cost, that Achilles had retired to his tent, or rather that Coriolanus had gone over to the Volscian camp, and had *organized victory* there, as Carnot is said to have done in the French revolutionary armies. The press had been for some time entirely free, and the war of parties was principally carried on, as must always happen in such a case, in the daily papers. On this ground, the liberalists, though feeble in the house, were very strong. Two of the best written and most widely circulated journals, the *Constitutionnel* and *Courier*, were avowedly in their interest. Two others, the *Quotidienne* and *Drapeau blanc*, representing the opinions of the discontented royalists, though they had comparatively a small circulation, were written with a good deal of ability, and rendered some service to the common cause. On the other hand, there were enlisted, in support of government, the official organ, called the *Moniteur*, and a morning and evening paper, called respectively, the *Gazette de France*, and the *Etoile*; but the main dependence was on the *Journal des Débats*, on the whole the ablest, and among men of weight and intelligence, the most extensively circulated and popular of all the journals. Unfortunately for the ministry, this important paper was devoted to the interest of M. de Châteaubriand, and, upon his removal from the cabinet, it went over at once to the opposition standard, and commenced a furious attack upon M. de Villèle, who, for ten years preceding, had been as the royalist leader, its constant theme of adulation. All the journals of much real influence were now, therefore, in open hostility to the ministry. The two which supported government, soon after combined their establishments into one, called the *Gazette de France*, and the ministerial star (*Etoile*) disappeared from the horizon. This was a proof of the small extent of the circulation of both these papers, and might have been viewed, in superstitious times, as a bad omen. With the exception

of the *Moniteur*, which takes little or no part in the passing controversies, there was now only one ministerial paper to sustain the onset of five or six of various colors and opinions, all equally hostile ; and while several of these were conducted with signal ability, the single champion of government seemed to be totally deficient both in power and address. Mistaking entirely the state of public feeling, and playing, as it were, into the hands of the enemy, he filled his columns habitually with labored apologies for the clergy, and especially the Jesuits, at the very moment when the opposition were chiefly anxious to establish, to the general satisfaction, that the government felt a deep interest in this obnoxious order. The effects of this unequal contest were soon perceived in a very rapid change of public opinion ; and the complaint made by the ministry, that this was occasioned by *journalism*, that is, by the influence of the newspapers, is, we believe, perfectly well founded. In fact, the dangers apprehended from the imprudence of the administration were entirely of a prospective kind, and had not yet made themselves felt in a material form. Never before had the state of the kingdom been in general more prosperous. Industry was flourishing beyond example in all its great branches ; the finances were entirely unembarrassed ; the army and the navy in the highest order, as has been amply shown by their excellent conduct in Spain and at Navarino ; the population rapidly increasing, and animated throughout by a natural and healthy activity, the best preservative and remedy against any tendency of a violent and morbid kind. Not to be able to govern a country thus situated would have seemed to argue, either that the people were essentially ungovernable, or the minister essentially incapable of governing. Nevertheless the popularity of M. de Villèle declined with astonishing rapidity. In the course of the year 1826, the growing strength of the opposition began to show itself plainly by the frequent returns of liberal deputies to fill the accidental vacancies that occurred from time to time in the house. Bourdeaux, the head quarters of royalism, elected M. Gautier, a liberal merchant of great respectability. The illustrious 'Nation's Guest,' Lafayette, not long after recovered his place. In the mean time, the opposition journals, encouraged by success, pursued their attack with unremitted or increasing vigor. The syren song of liberty and equality resounded every morning from the bureaux of the *Constitutionnel* and *Courier*. The terrible Viscount contin-

ued from day to day his *debates* on three and five per cents, and on the *monarchy*, no longer *according to the charter*; while the ultra-royalists denounced the minister at the same time as a secret adherent of the revolution. Abandoned by all but the Jesuits, whose alliance was even more fatal than the enmity of the other parties, M. de Villèle at length became satisfied that he could not stand the attack of the press, and must either silence it or retire. In the session of the winter of 1826-7, he accordingly proposed to the House of Deputies a new law on this subject; which passed that body, but with so much difficulty, that the minister did not venture to carry it to the Peers, where the government party has been somewhat feeble ever since the restoration. Things remained, therefore, in their former state, and according to the existing laws, the control of the press did not rest entirely in the hands of government. They could reëstablish the censorship if any extraordinary occasion required it, in the interval between two sessions of the Chambers; but it would expire again of itself at a certain period after their next meeting, if not renewed by law. Some days after the close of the session just alluded to, the government resorted to this extraordinary prerogative, and reëstablished the censorship, which was to be exercised under the direction of a council of censors, having for its president the Viscount de Bonald, author of the work called *Legislation Primitive*, a noted doctor in the very straitest sect of legitimacy. Having thus silenced the press for the time, and having also at present the command of the House of Deputies, the true policy of the minister, if resolved at all hazards to retain his place, seems to have been, to strengthen himself in the House of Peers, by a large new creation, and at the opening of the next session to restore the censorship permanently by law. The House of Deputies had still two years to run, and during this period the ferment created by the newspapers, supposing it to be wholly artificial and unreasonable, would have had ample time to subside. New events would have occurred to divert the current of public opinion, and before the arrival of the electors, the present alarm would in all probability have been forgotten. Instead of taking this course, the minister made up his mind to dissolve the House of Deputies. The object of this proceeding, considered as a mere measure of policy, is not apparent, since, while he hazarded everything by bringing on the elections in the midst of the existing ferment, he had nothing to gain by

success, having already a handsome majority in the lower house. We may therefore presume that M. de Villèle acted upon nobler and more honorable motives, than those of mere policy ; that finding himself assailed in various quarters by the voluntary organs of public opinion, he determined to appeal directly to the people, and if he found their decision turn against him, to retire at once. On this construction of his conduct, which, as being the most honorable to him, we are ready to admit as the true one, it is still difficult to see, why he should have resolved, at the same time, to take the extraordinary measure of creating between seventy and eighty new Peers ; since, if he failed in the election of the Deputies, he would still be obliged to resign, and this strong measure, which would then be of no use to him, would only embarrass the march of his successor ; while, on the other hand, if he succeeded with the Deputies, he had ample time before the meeting of the Chambers to strengthen himself with the Peers. Perhaps his confidence of a favorable result was such, that he felt himself at liberty to adopt beforehand a measure, which would be wanted only in case of success ; but if such were his feelings, it must be owned, that they do but little honor to his boasted discretion.

In the mean time, other demonstrations of his unpopularity, more significant even than the general consent of the journals, had exhibited themselves since the close of the session, and the reëstablishment of the censorship. When the king on his birth-day reviewed the National Guard, or militia of the city of Paris, comprehending all the substantial, middling classes of the population, their shouts of *Vive le Roy* were mingled even in his majesty's presence, with cries of *a bas les ministres*, "down with the ministers !" The next morning there appeared in the *Moniteur* a decree disbanding this most respectable corps. This vigorous exertion of authority, suitable perhaps in itself, since the decorum of monarchical governments does not admit that the king in person can ever be received with any other expressions than those of pleasure and loyalty, did not tend to conciliate the favor of the worthy burghers of Paris ; and Paris, as our readers are aware, is, politically speaking, only another name for France. Even the highest courts of justice, bodies much less likely than the militia of the capital to be the organs of a merely popular clamor, had expressed very strongly their disapprobation of the tendency observable in the march of the ministry. Most of the persons brought to trial about

this time for seditious publications, were acquitted ; and one of the courts, upon being urged in a formal petition by the count de Monttosier to institute a legal process against the Jesuits, although it declined proceeding in the form suggested, expressed a decided opinion, that the toleration of their establishments in France was illegal. Such were the not very flattering auspices, under which M. de Villèle concluded to make his appeal to the people. About the beginning of September last, there appeared at once in the *Moniteur*, several decrees, of which one declared the dissolution of the House of Deputies ; another ordered the preliminary arrangements for the election of a new one ; a third created about seventy-five new peers ; and a fourth restored the liberty of the press ; which, however, by virtue of the existing laws, would have revived of itself, without a special ordinance, upon the mere fact of the dissolution of the House.

Although this measure was sudden and generally unexpected, it does not appear to have taken the opposition by surprise. They had made, as it seems, all possible arrangements for conducting the elections to the greatest advantage ; and however sanguine may have been their hopes of success, the result probably very much surpassed them, and proportionally disappointed the expectations of the ministers. Instead of the poor fractional minority of twelve or fourteen, to which they were reduced in the last house, the liberal party now elected more than a hundred and fifty deputies of their own color. Among the number were all the most active and eminent supporters of this opinion, some of whom were returned from various departments, and by a sort of acclamation. M. Royer Collard was chosen in seven different places. General Lafayette and his son were elected. The Abbé de Pradt and M. Guizot took their seats, for the first time, on this occasion. At Paris, where the liberal ticket has generally prevailed, but where the vote at the last elections was nearly equally divided, and even went in one or two districts in favor of the government, it was now almost unanimous. The avowedly liberal party, and the discontented royalists had acted in concert throughout the country ; and in addition to the deputies of the former color, alluded to above, they elected not less than thirty or forty of the latter class. There was, in short, a burst of opposition which carried everything before it ; and it was evident from the moment of the elections, that the minister had lost the command of the

House. M. de Villèle and his colleagues of course resigned at once, to avoid worse consequences, and a new administration was formed, consisting of persons not particularly conspicuous in any party, but distinguished in general for talent and discretion. The most remarkable feature in the new arrangement was the separation of the department of public instruction from that of church affairs, the two having previously been united under the direction of the bishop of Hermopolis. The meaning of this measure was understood by the Jesuits, who, if the newspapers are not misinformed, took the hint at once, and without waiting for farther notice, immediately left the kingdom. The Dauphin, Duke of Angoulême, whose liberal inclinations are sufficiently notorious, and had been exhibited decidedly, during the Spanish war, although unfortunately counteracted at the time by a stronger influence of an opposite kind, was now entrusted with a partial superintendence over the war department. These proceedings, as well as the personal character of the new ministers, indicated the king's disposition to yield to the current of public opinion. About the first of February the House assembled, and it was found in fact, that the combined opposition parties possessed the majority. Of the five candidates for the place of president (speaker) of the House, two were taken from the discontented royalists, and the other three were avowedly liberal. At the head of the latter stood the name of M. Royer Collard, at present the most conspicuous member, and as it were the leader of that party, who was accordingly appointed. This nomination is another indication, still more decided than any preceding one, of the altered tone of the government. Some farther changes have since taken place in the administration, which, as well as the measures which have been adopted by the new ministers, have also been conceived in a liberal spirit. At the time when we write this article, the new arrangements are still not completed. The place of president of the council of ministers, which was occupied by M. de Villèle, and which carries with it the principal direction of the government, is yet vacant. As no other post has been assigned to M. de Châteaubriand, on every account the most conspicuous person in the opposition, it is possibly reserved for him. He seems indeed to be fairly entitled to it, and experience has shown that he is a person whose just claims it is somewhat dangerous to overlook.

But whatever place may be allotted to the noble Viscount in

the new administration, it is generally admitted by all parties, as we remarked above, that his exertions have been the main immediate cause of the downfall of the last. It would be difficult perhaps to find another example in history, of an individual determining successively by mere power of writing, and within the short space of seven or eight years, the prevalence of two directly opposite parties, in one of the first nations of the world. The life of Burke presents us with a case in some degree similar, but the contrast between the spirit and tendency of his early labors in favor of our revolution, and his later ones against that of France, is partly softened by the length of time that had intervened ; nor was his influence on the former occasion, though highly important, so completely decisive as it was in the latter. In the present instance, the intervention of M. de Châteaubriand was equally effective on both sides. He seems, like the Jupiter of Homer, to hold in his hands the balance of victory, and to regulate the fortunes of the adverse parties by the weight, which he may choose to throw into one or the other scale.

Seldom, if ever before, have achievements like these been effected by a single pen, and we can hardly find a parallel for them, except in the extravagant warlike feats of the heroes of romance, which, when we consider the vast influence of individual characters on the course of public affairs in general, are, after all, perhaps, less out of nature, than they are sometimes supposed to be. We may add, that these events, while they prove immediately the extraordinary talent of M. de Châteaubriand, tend also to exhibit the prodigious efficacy of *the pen*, as a political engine in the present state of society. The trident of Neptune, says a French poet of the last century, is the sceptre of the world ; and we may assume, perhaps, with equal truth, that in large civilized communities, organized in popular forms, a goose-quill is the sceptre of government. In such societies, the pen carries with it the power which belongs to *the sword*, in barbarous times, and that which belongs to *eloquence*, properly so called (that is, the gift of *speaking well*), in free states of limited extent and population. In the ancient republics, where all the citizens assembled in council to transact the public business, the most powerful orator settled the question in debate, and was thus the real sovereign. But in modern representative governments, mere eloquence is an instrument of secondary value, and indeed produces most of its effects

through the medium of the press. A great speech in parliament or in congress, is in general not so much intended to affect the decision of the question to which it relates, as to operate on public opinion through the newspapers. It is now understood that Burke, and not Pitt, was for England the real pilot 'that weathered the storm' of the French revolution. The name of Burke, said the late lord Thurlow, will be fresh in the memory of men, when those of Pitt and Fox are comparatively forgotten. We would not, however, be understood to mean, that the influence of the pen has no limits. The progress of political affairs is determined in general by the changes that occur in the condition of different nations, or of the world, and it is only in an order subordinate to these, that the warrior, the writer, and the orator, who act immediately on the form of particular events, produce their effects. Thus in the instance before us, M. de Châteaubriand is able, by the mere force of writing, to govern the various elements that affect the struggle between the two great parties existing in his country, and to give the victory to the one, to which he chooses to attach himself; but let him attempt to create a new party of his own, entirely independent of previous opinions and interests, and he would not perhaps obtain a proselyte. The power of individuals, however great within their sphere of action, is confined by the necessity of nature to certain limits. These they rarely desire or attempt to exceed; and if they do, they are reduced at once to utter insignificance.

Having thus stated, with as much detail as our limits would admit, the causes that have led to the late political changes in France, we shall now advert to their probable consequences—a point which we shall treat with greater brevity. We have already remarked, that the triumph of the opposition, or liberal party, is much more complete, than it has ever been at any other moment since the restoration. Perceiving the persons and the principles, to which they habitually give the name of *revolutionary*, recovering their ascendancy, it is not unnatural for the royalists to take the alarm, and to suppose that the country is threatened with a new revolution. This apprehension is already loudly expressed in their speeches and newspapers, and the king is adjured as he values his crown and life, and as he wishes to avoid the fate of his unhappy brother, to take the most vigorous measures, while it is yet time, for checking the evil. The principal question which we have now to

consider, is, whether there be any real foundation for their alarms,—whether the liberal party, being clothed with power, will run on with heedless fury, in what they call the career of reform, until they again subvert all the establishments of the country, or whether they will rest within the limits of the charter, and content themselves with accommodating the form of the administration more nearly to the letter, and what they regard as the spirit of that instrument. The latter supposition we consider as the more probable one, for the following reasons.

The real cause of the apprehension now felt by the royalists of the occurrence of a new revolution, is doubtless the fact, that under circumstances which they view as substantially the same, a revolution occurred forty years ago. But supposing the similarity of circumstances to be as great as they believe it to be, it is obvious that the conclusion is by no means a necessary one. A revolution happens in a certain state of things, partly, perhaps principally, because it was not anticipated. Upon a recurrence of a similar situation, it is much less likely to happen, for the precise reason, that it *is* anticipated. This single difference between the circumstances of the two cases,—if there were no other, as there are very many,—would be sufficient to invalidate the conclusion drawn by the royalists, from their similarity, and to remove the ground of their present terrors.

Independently of this circumstance, we consider the existing French constitution as resting on foundations, that are not to be readily shaken by the efforts of a merely popular party, however active and powerful within the country. The present system, which is expressed and represented by the charter, is, as we understand it, a sort of compromise, or middle term, between the form of government naturally resulting from the condition of society in France, and the one which would be most acceptable to the great continental powers. France, if left entirely to herself, would become a *republic*; while the allies, could they have their way, would convert the government very shortly into a simple *monarchy*. But in the present state of Europe and of France, neither the inclinations of the sovereigns nor those of the French people, can be entirely overlooked, and the existing constitution is, as we conceive, a compound result of the influence of the two elements. It is there guarantied in both its essential parts, by substantial secu-

rities, of a kind not likely to give way. The popular provisions represent the state of the nation, and must last as long as that remains what it is. Its monarchical features, which are now supposed to be in danger, represent the policy of the great continental allies, are sustained by the moral influence of these powers, and will be, if the occasion require it, by their military force. From this view of the subject it seems to us quite evident, that although the form and spirit of the administration may fluctuate considerably within the limits of the charter, and will probably for some time to come be much more liberal than they were under the last ministry, the two great component elements of the present constitution must retain substantially the same proportional weight, while the state of Europe and of France remains in substance what it is now.

We think we hazard little in expressing, as above, the opinion, that the form of government most natural to France, in its present situation, is that of a republic. On this subject the leading consideration is the state of property. In all communities, as far as they are really independent, the form of the political constitution naturally accommodates itself to the substance, that is, the condition of the people; and the exercise of nominal power falls into the hands of those who possess the reality, that is, wealth, and the knowledge and influence over others which attend it. Where the mass of property is concentrated in a few hands, the constitution is essentially aristocratic, and has a natural tendency to become so in form. When property is much subdivided and widely distributed among the people, the constitution is essentially democratic, and has, in like manner, a natural tendency to assume a popular shape. Such is the state of things in these United States; and it is to this circumstance, that we must look as the solid and lasting security for our popular institutions and personal rights, under the various changes of fortune, that may happen to us, in matters within the reach of accident. In England the opposite principle prevails; and serves, in like manner, as a solid foundation for the institutions existing in that country. In France the property is minutely subdivided as with us. It appears from official returns, that not less than half the heads of families are landholders; and there is no such thing in the kingdom as a class of great proprietors. Hence the French constitution, though copied in form from that of Great Britain, is in substance and principle entirely different from it. The Parliament of England, in both its

branches, is a representation of the small class of wealthy proprietors who form the ruling aristocracy, with a trifling mixture of purely popular elements. In France, where no such class exists, the two Chambers form a double representation of the mass of the community; for although the electors are limited in number to about eighty thousand, they have no distinct interest from that of the body of the people, and are animated by the same spirit. In the former country the titles of the aristocracy indicate large masses of real power, in the latter they only serve to improve the style of a visiting card. Hence, as *aristocracy* is by general acknowledgment the principle of the British government, it is equally evident that the one which prevails in that of France is *democracy*; and it thus appears, that the attempt to copy as closely as possible the form of the British Constitution has resulted in the establishment of another, not only of a different, but of a directly opposite character. So true is this in practice, that the somewhat greater independence of the house of Peers has served only to render this body, what it has been ever since the Restoration, a more popular one than the house of deputies. In a government essentially aristocratic, although the substance of monarchy cannot exist, the form may well be preserved, as in England, because it naturally allies itself with the form of aristocracy; but it is not very easy to see how the form even of monarchy can long be preserved in an essentially democratic government, with the natural form, as well as the spirit, of which it is entirely at variance. Such a combination, after having been established and long maintained by force, might perhaps continue to exist after the force which created it had ceased to operate; as appears to be the case in some of the great Asiatic empires, where men are contented to pursue from century to century the track beaten by their forefathers. But no such thing can happen in the constantly agitated states of christendom; and least of all in France, by temperament the most uneasy and restless of the number. We are therefore compelled to believe, that in the French constitution the monarchical and aristocratic elements are mere shadows, without any corresponding substance; and that the point towards which the efforts of the popular, or more properly, *national* party, by the force of circumstances naturally tend, and at which, if unchecked by any foreign intervention, they would speedily arrive, is the establishment of a *representative republic*. Few if any of the individuals composing this party are now

aiming directly, even in secret, at this object. They deem it, as in fact it is, impracticable, without in all cases realising that the only objection to it lies in the policy of foreign powers. But they all by a sort of instinct admire it in theory ; and considering our institutions as the nearest approach to it that has been made in practice, they often mention them in the strongest and most flattering terms of approbation, as the *beau idéal* of government, a bright ethereal dream of perfection too beautiful to be ever realised in the corrupt societies of the old world.

But while a representative republic appears to be the form of government most natural to France in its present condition, it is equally or still more evident, that the great military powers of the continent can never consent to the introduction of such institutions in that country. The general reason for this is the same, which induced the authors of our constitution to guaranty to all the states a republican government, or in other words, to interdict throughout the Union the establishment of monarchy. The commonwealth of Europe, though not in form a confederacy of states, is as much so in fact as this American Union ; and in all such confederacies the concert of action among the members, necessary to the march of government, absolutely requires that the forms of legislation and administration should be throughout to a certain extent homogeneous. In the case of small and unimportant members, a deviation from the principle would of course not be attended with danger. Such republics as those of San Marino, Cracow, and Switzerland, may be admitted on the continent. But in states of the first order, an exception from the general rule could never be a matter of indifference, least of all in France, the intellectual and moral metropolis of cultivated Europe, the arbitress of elegance, the mother of the graces, the mistress of politeness and civilization, the fountain of the language and literature, the arts, manners, fashions, and amusements, and by a necessary consequence the feelings and opinions of the higher ranks of all other countries. A violent departure on the part of this most important and interesting member, from the political forms observed throughout the system, must produce convulsions which could end only by a return, complete or partial, to the common model. Such in fact was the occasion and result of the long wars of the Revolution, which had no other real origin than the obvious and deeply felt incongruity between the new French institutions and those which existed elsewhere.

On the other hand, the principle, that in every independent society the form of government naturally adapts itself to the condition of the people, is equally certain in its operation, with that which requires a degree of uniformity among the members of the same confederacy. When, therefore, a real change takes place in the condition of a people forming with others a political system, of which it is a member too important to be neglected, and too powerful to be dictated to (and such was actually the case with France), the two principles are brought into open conflict, and no alternative is left, except that of an exterminating war or a compromise. Under the peculiar forms which regulate the international concerns of the European commonwealth, it was natural that the first resort should be to war ; and it was also natural, in the present state of civilization, that the war thus undertaken should not be urged to the extreme point of entire extermination, but that the adverse parties, after they had fairly supped full of horrors, should find it in the end more profitable to reconcile the difference between them by mutual concession. The result was the adoption of the present French constitution, which is thus, as we have remarked, guaranteed in its monarchical parts, by the policy of the continental powers, and in its popular ones by the condition of the French people, and may of course be considered as reposing, in both its great divisions, upon a firm and substantial basis, not to be shaken by the fluctuations of merely domestic parties, or by any convulsions, that do not, at the same time, unsettle the general system of Europe.

Such are the reasons which lead us to think that the monarchical principle will not be subverted, as the royalists now affect to believe, by the present reaction in favor of the liberal party. All France is perfectly aware, that every attempt to overthrow the monarchy, or even to change the dynasty, would be immediately followed by another general invasion from the North and East ; and having ascertained, by repeated experiments, the complete certainty of this result, the mere terror of it will be sufficient in future to prevent the necessity of its recurrence. It is not in human nature to persist long in attempting to pass the limits of possibility, physical or moral. It is nevertheless probable that the acquiescence of the nation under political arrangements, determined in part by the policy of foreign powers, will appear for a considerable time somewhat reluctant and uneasy, because the situation supposes a partial sacrifice of

national independence. Hence perhaps the ‘indescribable disease,’ *mal indefinissable*, as the Bishop of Hermopolis qualifies it, with which France seems to be laboring, under circumstances of the highest general prosperity. Add to this the natural mobility of the French character, and the prodigious influence of a single large city on the politics of the kingdom, and we have causes enough to account for all the agitation we have lately witnessed. But this, should it even increase for awhile, will exhaust itself, we think, in modifications of the present institutions, coming within the limits and spirit of the charter, for the most part salutary, and not of a nature at all events to disturb the tranquillity of the world. The control of the presses will probably now for the first time be taken entirely out of the hands of government. The system of elections has already attracted the attention of the ministers, and will doubtless be rendered more popular. The municipal organization of the kingdom will be completed. In short, the liberty of the subject will be in various ways considerably extended and better defined and secured, than it has ever been before in France. Conceiving, as we do, that individual liberty, pushed to the farthest limit consistent with the preservation of social order and the public tranquillity, is the main principle of national prosperity and private happiness, we cannot but anticipate that much advantage will accrue from the changes to which we have alluded. It would give us pleasure to dwell at greater length upon these agreeable and encouraging prospects; but we are compelled to quit the subject, in order to devote our remaining pages to a few hasty remarks upon the affairs of the East of Europe.

3. The limited space we now have at command will oblige us to treat this question in a very summary manner, nor is it necessary for the information of the public, to enter into the detail of the political and military events of the Greek revolution preceding the treaty of London of the sixth of July, of last year. The correspondence and personal communications of our high minded fellow citizens, who have embarked in this sacred cause, have rendered the subject more familiar to the general reader than any other branch of foreign politics; and we have ourselves repeatedly taken occasion to advert to it in various former numbers of this journal. As far as the condition of the Greeks connects itself with the policy of the leading powers of Western Europe, for two or three years past, the simple ques-

tion with these powers has been, whether they would look on quietly, till they saw the last descendant of the countrymen of Homer and Plato, Socrates and Phidias, Miltiades, Epaminondas, and Philopœmen, or in one word, the last of the Greeks, slaughtered by a horde of savage bandits, on the native soil of his ancestors ; or whether they would step in with one accord, and deliver the poor bleeding remnant of this wretched people from the jaws of swift destruction. The case even on this statement appears strong ; for when common sense and satire have said as much as they please of the impropriety of mixing up poetry and the classics with the political combinations of the day, it is still certain that we cannot and ought not to regard such a contest as this with indifference. Every generous heart thrills with emotion at the bare mention of the plains of Marathon and Elis, the straits of Salamis and Thermopylæ, the vale of Tempe, the summits of Pindus and Aonian Aganippe, or the springs of Castalia and Helicon ; and if other considerations of a higher order require the sacrifice of these emotions, we are conscious at the moment, that we are suppressing some of the noblest affections of our nature. The case is therefore, we repeat, in itself a very strong one, even leaving out of view the still deeper and higher, and more solemn motive of a common faith. But strong as it is, it was strengthened by circumstances which amounted to an actual obligation of the most imperious kind, at least on Russia, to lend some active assistance to the Greeks. This wretched and fallen race, crushed to the earth under the iron yoke of their oppressors, had lost every hope or thought of attempting to recover their national existence, until they were roused by the exertions of emissaries from the great christian powers. For half a century the Russian agents had been from time to time laboring, with more or less activity, in exciting the Greeks to assert their independence, ; and these proceedings were undoubtedly the real immediate cause of the present revolutionary movement. To invite, seduce rather, a feeble nation to join in a common struggle against a powerful enemy, such an enemy as the Turks, and then to desert them in the hour of trial, and give them up without assistance to indiscriminate and hopeless destruction, would be not mere injustice, but the height of baseness. It is a policy that would brand the proudest sovereign in Europe with infamy. Add to all these considerations the diabolical and cold blooded horrors perpetrated by the Turks at the opening of the struggle, and

their repeated and contemptuous infractions of their treaties with Russia ; and we make out a case upon which that powerful government might have been expected to act with promptness, and undoubtedly would have acted at most other periods without a moment's hesitation.

But the emperor Alexander was advised to see emblazoned, on the banner of the Greeks, the fatal sign of *revolution*, the terror of which had in his latter years bewildered his fine understanding, and diverted his naturally liberal and generous spirit from the glorious objects to which his earlier life was devoted. This single defect, under the peculiar circumstances of the moment, outweighed all the claims of the Greeks to protection, and produced in the emperor's mind, not merely a disinclination to aid them, but an actual wish for their failure. He looked upon their movements as a branch of the vast system of freemasonry and *carbonarism*, to which he attributed all the troubles of Europe, and which he supposed to be at this time operating with new vigor in the two Peninsulas, in such a way as to require a military intervention on his part to check its progress. In this state of things, he not only felt no disposition to take part with the Greeks, but had it been in his power to settle the question by a word, he would have doubtless decided it against them. To avoid even the suspicion of any intention to favor them, he removed from about his person one of his principal ministers of state, for no other reason than that he was a native of Greece, and might be naturally considered partial to the cause. With the emperor Alexander the great difficulty seems to have been, how to avoid being forced into a war with Turkey, by the headlong and reckless imprudence of that power, and thus compelled against his will to coöperate indirectly with the Greek insurgents. On the other hand the British government were impressed with a terror of the vast and growing power of Russia, not less urgent, and a good deal better founded, than those with which the emperor had been inspired by the redoubtable society of *Colliers* ; and being aware that from the relative positions of Greece and Russia, and the community of religion existing between them, any successful European intervention in favor of the former, must necessarily end in an augmentation of the influence of the latter, they were highly gratified to find the emperor animated by hostile, instead of friendly dispositions towards his brethren of the Greek faith. The only thing necessary, under such circumstances, in order

to avert entirely the threatened danger, was to prevent the rupture between Russia and Turkey (upon grounds entirely independent of the Greek question) which appeared almost inevitable, and which, if it took place, would produce a diversion in favor of the Greeks, equivalent in all its results to a direct intervention. Great Britain undertook accordingly to mediate between the two powers for this purpose, and the emperor Alexander, who, for different reasons, was equally anxious to effect the same object, availed himself gladly of the overture. Having been compelled, by the outrageous conduct of the Turks, to withdraw his own minister from Constantinople, he committed the negotiation entirely to the British ambassador, lord Strangford, who carried it on with great ability for two or three years. During this time the world beheld, with astonishment and edification, the two most powerful nations in Europe receiving, one as principal and the other as mediator, from a feeble and semi-barbarous government, a series of injuries and insults, the least of which, in most other circumstances, would have occasioned an exterminating war. All this more than Christian long-suffering appeared however to meet with its reward. The direct causes of quarrel between Russia and the Ottoman Porte were at last removed, and a new treaty, apparently satisfactory to all parties, was concluded at Ackerman, on the sixth of August, 1826. The Turkish government in their late manifesto very frankly avow, that they signed the treaty merely to gain time and escape from farther importunity ; so that they appear to have had the honor of overreaching, as well as treating with undisguised contumely and outrage, the two most powerful nations in Europe. This however was not suspected at the moment, and the British government retired from the field of negotiation, flushed with supposed triumph, and full of satisfaction at having averted all danger of a rupture between the emperor of Russia and their 'ancient ally,' the Turk.

In the meantime the emperor Alexander had been called to his account, and his youthful successor, who had given proof, by his conduct in the circumstances attending his accession, of a noble and generous disposition, was believed or suspected to be somewhat less timorous on the score of revolution, and somewhat better inclined to assist the Greeks by direct intervention, than his predecessor. Thus while the danger of the diversion in favor of the Greeks, which would have resulted from a rupture between Russia and Turkey, was supposed to have disap-

peared, that of the direct intervention by the latter power seemed to be increasing. Mr. Canning, whose influence in the British cabinet was at this time rapidly growing, was not disposed, by character, to trust much for the removal of difficulties to the slow developments of time, in many cases the safest course, but was rather for cutting all knots of this kind by vigorous measures, conceiving that the superiority of his talent would always carry him through with credit and success. We may add, that while he was doubtless not less jealous than his countrymen in general of the power of Russia, he was probably somewhat more alive than his immediate predecessor, to the high moral considerations which plead so loudly with every elevated and naturally feeling mind, in favor of the suffering Greeks. Under the influence of these various motives, he accordingly determined to propose to Russia a joint interference for their relief, believing that the coöperation of the two powers, backed as they would probably be by most of the other leading governments, would effect the object without much difficulty ; and that by thus taking an active part in the intervention, in concert with Russia, it would be easy so to govern the course of affairs, as to prevent that power from acquiring, in any event, any dangerous augmentation of influence. The proposition was made to the Russian government, by the duke of Wellington, in the spring of 1826, and having been accepted with readiness, formed the basis of a protocol or informal treaty between the parties. Negotiations were immediately commenced upon this basis at Constantinople, and, in the mean time, the other powers were invited to accede to the arrangement. France alone consented, and at her instance, as it appears, the informal agreement at St Petersburg was converted into a formal treaty between the three powers, which was signed at London on the tenth of last July. The general import of this instrument is of course familiar to all our readers, who take any interest in the subject. It provided for a joint proposal by the three mediating powers to the two conflicting parties, to reconcile their differences upon certain specified terms. Upon the refusal of both or either of them to accept this proposal, the powers, without formally declaring or making war, were to interfere and forcibly separate the combatants. Such was the purport of this treaty, which by a piece of indiscretion unexampled in diplomatic history, was published in the British newspapers even to its secret articles, within a day or two of its signa-

ture, and before it had been ratified by all the parties to it, or officially made known at Constantinople. Count Capo d'Istria appears to have taken part in the arrangement, as the representative of Greece, and was immediately placed at the head of the executive department of the government of that country.

The treaty of the sixth of July was generally hailed, by liberal and feeling men, as a measure highly honorable to all the parties engaged in it, and likely to be attended with the happiest consequences. When viewed merely in reference to its effects on the fortunes of the Greeks, it will always probably bear this character. A cool consideration of the circumstances of the case, aided by the partial developement that has already taken place of the results of the treaty, may perhaps lead us to conclude, that it could not fairly be expected to realise the intentions under which it was concluded; and that as a diplomatic and especially a British measure, it must necessarily fail, and was of course impolitic and unwise. From the commencement of the Greek revolution, the great problem with the British government has been, how to aid the Greeks, without incurring the danger of increasing the influence of Russia. Now the mere diminution of the Turkish power, which would be occasioned by the emancipation of the Greeks, would itself negatively produce this effect; while emancipated Greece, under whatever form or name, must be substantially, for the present at least, little more than a province of Russia, and from its southern, and maritime position would constitute a positive accession of high importance and value to that vast empire. These were necessary results of the force of circumstances; and independent altogether of any supposed ambitious designs in the Russian government. The problem was therefore evidently insoluble, and having been viewed as such from the beginning, by the British government, the idea of aiding the Greeks had never been entertained for a moment. Mr Canning, upon taking up the question, apparently left out of view the consideration to which we have now alluded, and proceeded on the supposition, that there could be no augmentation of the power of Russia, excepting by the actual and formal annexation of some province to her territories. His course in this respect is the more remarkable, inasmuch as the very form of the arrangements in which he was engaged, strikingly illustrated the dangers to which we have alluded. It was perfectly evident that Greece, under the government of Count Capo d'Istria,

must be essentially a Russian province. Having however, as we have remarked, left this difficulty entirely out of view, and supposing the only danger to be that of actual territorial aggrandizement by Russia, which could only take place in time of war, he appears to have calculated first that the vast weight of a joint intervention of all the great European powers could hardly fail to succeed, and would thus be attended with perfect safety ; or supposing it even to fail, that the relation established between Russia and the other powers, by this concerted system of action, would enable them to prevent any abuse by her of the results of the partial war which would then follow. Of these two calculations the former has already been shown by the event to have been erroneous ; but, it is proper to add, it has been defeated in part by the accidental occurrence of the battle of Navarino. The latter was in the main just, as respects the conclusion ; for although we doubt the ability of the other powers to oppose by force any permanent barrier to the aggrandizement of Russia, we believe that they are secure enough from any danger of that kind, in the moderation which has prevailed for a long time past in the councils of that empire, and has now, greatly to its honor and advantage, become their habitual characteristic. We are satisfied for this reason, that, in the event of war, there is no probability that Russia will claim more than a fair proportion of the common spoil. But had both these calculations been completely justified by the event, it would have still, as we remarked above, left in full force the main objection to an intervention, politically considered ; to wit, that it must, if successful, place the Greeks in any event virtually under the protectorate of Russia, and in this way, as well as by proportionally diminishing the power of Turkey, augment the influence of the formidable rival of Great Britain. We may therefore conclude, that the treaty of July, however agreeable to the friends of humanity, who care less about the comparative weight of England and Russia, than about the immediate relief of their oppressed and agonising fellow-creatures, was, when viewed as a merely British measure, at best very questionable. From the precipitation with which it was hurried through, and the indiscretion with which it was so prematurely published, we may perhaps suspect that it was somewhat hastily and rashly determined upon by Mr Canning, under the influence of the sort of intellectual fever with which he seems to have labored for some time previous to his death (occasioned

no doubt in part by this cause), and which threw a sort of extravagant and inflammatory coloring over all his late proceedings and speeches.

If the policy of this treaty, considered as a British measure, was in some degree doubtful, the details of the arrangement appear to be also liable to serious objections, of which events have shown the validity. The alternative offered to the Porte under the treaty of July, was substantially that of acquiescence in certain propositions, or of war. Nevertheless, the three powers abstain from pronouncing the fatal word, and only declare that in the event of refusal, they will interfere by force and separate the combatants. Not only this, but they affect, ever since the battle of Navarino, to deny the existence of war. The battle, they say, was fought by the Allies in bare self-defence; and if the peace be after all broken, it will not be their fault. This language appears singular; nor is it easy to see in what quarter it is intended to produce effect. It must clearly fail with the Turks, whose moral faculties are by no means delicate enough to seize the nice distinction made by the Allies. The hesitation of the latter, in pronouncing the decisive word, was doubtless construed at Constantinople into timidity, and tended of course to defeat the arrangement. The real object of giving it this form appears to have been, to deprive Russia of the pretext which she might otherwise have had, for putting her armies in motion in the event of the non-acceptance of the proposals. As the Allies are not to make war, but merely to step between the combatants, and separate them where they are actually engaged, and as this is not the case on the northern frontier, there is of course no occasion for Russia to move, and the active part of the interference falls entirely into the hands of Great Britain. This ingenious scheme, which takes for granted that Russia is ready to seize the first opportunity of aggrandizing herself by violent means, and that she can be prevented from so doing by such a diplomatic contrivance as the one in question, is far from complimentary, either to her moderation or sagacity. Conscious of possessing superior power, and intending to use it with a just regard for the rights of others, the giant of the North may probably have smiled with pity at this feeble attempt to fetter him with cobwebs, and pursued his course with unaltered tranquillity; but it is evident, that such a display of jealousy and want of confidence on the part of an ally, at the very moment of establishing a concert of action, if it

did not irritate and offend, had no tendency to conciliate, or to improve in any way the state of affairs. This device therefore, while it was wholly ineffectual for every good purpose, was of a nature to embarrass the operations of the Allies in the event of refusal, and even to place them morally in the wrong, if that were a point worth considering with the Turks. In the intercourse of nations there is no middle course between war and peace. If the Allies intended to remain at peace with the Turks, they had no right to interfere between them and the Greeks, whether the latter be viewed as enemies or rebellious subjects. If they intended to make war, they had then doubtless a right to assist the Greeks, but were bound in the first place to give due notice of their intentions by a public and intelligible declaration. In this, as in most other cases, a perfectly frank, open, and manly course would have been on all accounts the most politic, as well as the most honorable and just. By keeping firmly in view and announcing distinctly to the Porte, that the real alternative was that of peace with the Greeks or war with themselves, the Allies would have had a better chance of avoiding this extremity, and would have been certainly better prepared to meet it, if unavoidable, than they were found to be when the crisis arrived.

It is comparatively easy to be wise after the event, but in the doubtful situation in which things were placed by the provisions of the treaty, the occurrence of some such affair as the battle of Navarino seems to have been probable ; and if this action be, as it certainly is, and has been publicly declared to be by the British government, for them at least, an *untoward event*, it furnishes a strong illustration of the impolicy of these provisions. It is not necessary to our present purpose to enlarge upon the circumstances of this affair. Considered as between the Allies and the Turks, it was on the part of the former a manifest infraction of all the ordinary rules of public law ; and the feeble attempts made in England to justify it on the principle of self-defence, only prove, that those who make them are conscious of having done a wrong action, without being willing to acknowledge and repair it. The fault, however, lies with the governments, and not with the naval commanders. The British admiral was not expressly authorized by his instructions to go the full length to which he went ; but he nevertheless appears to have played the part of a gallant and efficient officer, following in general the tenor of his orders, and con-

struing them, when doubtful, in favor of prompt and energetic action. He is therefore, we conceive, in no way to blame, but rather entitled to thanks and credit, as well for going into battle, as for his excellent conduct when engaged. The real difficulty lay in the false position of the Allied and Turkish forces in relation to each other; and this was a necessary result of the terms of the treaty, for which the ministers, and not the admirals, were responsible. The former had so arranged matters, that the latter, by performing their duty in a manly and vigorous way, could hardly fail to precipitate the war which the Allies were so anxious to avoid, and which, if they thought it unavoidable, they ought to have declared themselves, instead of leaving the Turks to learn it from the total destruction of their fleet. This event, confessedly *untoward* in its effect on the question of peace and war, is not perhaps in other respects precisely in accordance with British interests. The sort of instinct, which leads a British naval commander to attack any foreign flag upon the least appearance of pretext or provocation, and which in some former cases, as in this, has occasioned the destruction of whole fleets belonging to powers with which Great Britain was at peace, is generally a safe and wholesome one, because it tends even in its excesses to promote and secure the naval ascendancy of the kingdom. When, for example, a British admiral attacked, in time of peace, and completely destroyed the Spanish fleet of twenty-five sail of the line, which cardinal Alberoni had with so much ability created in the course of a few months, the mistake, though unpleasant perhaps to both parties, was far less injurious to the interests of Great Britain, than to those of his Catholic majesty. But in the present instance (to which the occurrence just alluded to furnishes the nearest parallel to be found in history), the operation of the principle was less favorable. The Turks, if not an ancient, are, at least since the great recent developement of the Russian power, an actual ally of England, the more important and useful, inasmuch as their naval strength, though considerable, at least before the late event, can never be dangerous. When therefore we see the British and French fleets joining in an annihilation of that of Turkey, the only permanent check to the increase of the maritime greatness of Russia in the quarter where it was most to be apprehended, we are bound to recognise with due humility the hand of Providence, overmastering the ordinary motives that govern

human actions, and making them subservient to the promotion of his own all-wise and inscrutable designs.

Such was the anxiety entertained in England for the preservation of peace, that the government, disposed to believe what they so ardently desired, did not entirely abandon all hope even after the battle of Navarino. It was doubtless one of the objects of the new ministerial arrangements, to facilitate as far as possible this result ; and the feigned moderation of the Porte rendered it for a moment apparently not quite desperate. Even the appearance of the Turkish manifesto, though in substance and form an undisguised and even insulting declaration of war, does not seem to have entirely dissipated the illusion. If at least we can draw any conclusion from the tone of the newspapers, hopes are even yet indulged, that, by the effect of the change of ministry, the crisis may be avoided. The passage of the Russian armies over the Pruth, the great new Rubicon, not of Rome, but of Asia and Europe, though often announced, is not, while we are writing, ascertained to have taken place. It *may* yet be averted by efforts hidden from the public eye, and on which it is vain to speculate. But in the aspect of things, as it *now* presents itself to us, on this side of the water, war is inevitable.

It is not unlikely that war has actually commenced. When, how, where it will end,—whether it will prove a passing commotion, like those which have disturbed the south of Europe since the fall of Bonaparte, or whether it will turn out one of those tremendous hurricanes which from time to time convulse the European system for twenty or thirty years together, are questions which ‘time and the hour’ alone can solve. That the Turkish empire, wholly incapable of contending successfully with either of the great powers now leagued against it, must give way before the union of them all, is a matter of course ; and the results of the struggle will therefore depend almost wholly upon the form which policy or accident may give to the relations between these powers. From the jealousy entertained by England and France of the progress of Russia, it will doubtless be their effort to limit the duration and theatre of the war, and to secure the original objects of the intervention with as little diminution as possible of the power of Turkey. On this supposition, the war will be speedily terminated, and the principal direct result will be the emancipation of Greece, a consummation highly agreeable in itself to the

civilized world at large, but somewhat ominous in the view of the western powers of Europe, as contributing both directly and indirectly (in the manner explained above) to the augmentation of the influence of Russia. A larger, more generous, and perhaps in the end not less safe and judicious policy would be, to take advantage of the present favorable crisis for the purpose of overthrowing entirely the Ottoman empire, and restoring to civilization and christianity the fine regions that have so long withered under its blasting sway. By a concert of action among the great powers the object might of course be effected at once; and the princely spoils that victory would throw into the hands of the alliance would furnish, one would think, means of satisfying the pretensions of all, with little or no risk of internal dissension. Greece with her islands, the continental provinces of Turkey in Europe, Asia Minor, Syria and Palestine, all Arabia, Egypt, Barbary and Morocco, territories as fertile as any in the world, and as finely situated for the pursuit of every species of industry, would be at the disposal of christian Europe. They might be distributed as provinces among the allies, or erected into independent nations, as might best comport with the general good; but they would become equally, in either case, abodes of knowledge, wealth, and happiness, instead of being, as they now are, the eternal haunts of pestilence, poverty, and wretchedness. What sublime prospects of extended population and improvement would open on the ancient world, could the Mediterranean sea be again, as formerly, encircled by a line of flourishing christian states. This magnificent basin, which forms as it were the heart of the vast body, composed by the three ancient continents, would in that case send forth rivers of strength and prosperity in all directions, and would resuscitate, as if from their sepulchres, the industry, the arts, the population, the wealth, and the liberty, that once adorned these delightful climates. The valley of the Nile would again boast its thousand cities; Barbary would display as of old her three hundred Universities; Palestine would flow once more with milk and honey; the sacred standard of the true religion would take the place of the miscalled *Sandjar Sherif* on the towers of St Sophia, and a new spring would revive the dead groves of the Academy. Even the christian nations of Southern Europe, which now stagnate in a sort of hopeless decrepitude, under the influence of vicious institutions, religious and political, would feel the effect of this change in a restora-

tion of their industry and commerce, and under this genial impulse, would recover their ancient prosperity and glory. The remoter regions of Southern Africa, on the one hand, and of Arabia and Persia, on the other, would gradually quicken into moral life, and be brought in time within the pale of the civilized world. Such are the prospects that would open upon Christendom in the event of a vigorous and concerted action of all the great powers against the Turkish empire. But we do not, as we have already said, expect that they will now be realized. The not unfounded caution of Great Britain, and the noble moderation of Russia will combine to limit the theatre of the war and its results, within the smallest possible space. Let us then be content, for the present, with the emancipation of Greece,—an event which seems to be now beyond the reach of accident, and which twenty years ago we should hardly have thought within the compass of possibility. This, if not the most important, is doubtless the most surprising and agreeable of the various revolutions of our eventful age. The affections of the generous and the good have always attached themselves with a sort of melancholy interest to the soil of this celebrated country, and they are ready to welcome the restoration of its inhabitants to national existence, as they would the return of a lost friend from the grave. In the present altered state of the world, we cannot anticipate a complete revival of the taste and genius of ancient Greece, still less a renewal of her political ascendancy; but under the inspiring influence of independence, commerce, and industry, we shall doubtless behold a remarkable improvement in the now deteriorated character of the people, and a rapid developement of all the elements of general prosperity.

We have thus noticed successively the leading points in the present state of the politics of Europe, and the extent of the preceding remarks reminds us that we must bring them rapidly to a close. The point of view which presents these occurrences in connexion with each other, as accidents happening to the different parts of the same great system, opens new fields of observation still more interesting perhaps, than those which we have surveyed. The prodigious ascendancy of Great Britain and Russia over all the other powers, even those habitually reckoned as the first rate, the healthy, vigorous, and active constitution of Russia, as compared with the embarrassed and distracted situation of the Western nations, these are traits in the

picture, which strike the observant eye too plainly to be overlooked or mistaken, which are important even to us, and to Europe momentous, perhaps alarming. At other times Austria, France, Great Britain, even Spain and Turkey, have successively kept the other nations in terror, and swayed for a while the sceptre of christendom. Now the Autocrat of Russia rules the ascendant ; Great Britain leads the defensive ; France follows in the wake of one or the other, while the rest of the powers, including even Austria, are passive spectators. Again ; what stability, vigor, and wisdom, on one side ! What division, feebleness, confusion, on the other ! Behold France, illustrious, beautiful, cultivated France, rent in twain by permanent political dissensions, that can never be reconciled ; Russia presenting to the world a compact and undivided mass, or if accidental troubles occur, only making them occasions for new displays of magnanimity and wisdom in the highest quarters. Compare for a moment the generous contention between the Granddukes Nicolas and Constantine, who should *not* be the emperor of all the Russias, with the paltry five and three per cent. struggles between Messrs de Villèle and de Châteaubriand, each anxious not so much to obtain power himself, as to prevent the other from possessing it. Contrast the correspondence of the high-minded Muscovite princes, on the occasion just alluded to, with the debates in the British Parliament, on the several changes in the ministry since the death of Mr Canning. Contrast the tone of the papers and speeches of this justly eminent statesman on the most important subjects, with the decision, depth, and moderation of the Russian diplomacy. We seem to pass from the domain of one of the two great principles which divide the world between them into that of the other, and unhappily the west is not the bright side. The power of Russia is no doubt tremendous, and the steady, untiring march of her military progress must inspire the western nations with serious alarms. While the councils of Great Britain are suspended on the grand question, whether Lord Althorpe shall be chairman of a Committee of Finance, which finally unsettles the government ; while France is agitated through all her departments by the momentous *debates* of half a dozen newspapers, the Russian armies are crossing the Araxes. They dictate peace on their own terms in the second city in Persia. This treaty is, it seems, not ratified, and the next will of course be signed at Teheran. In the meantime, another army is pouring into the Ottoman

Empire, while Count Capo d'Istria, with the title of President, is, virtually in the name of Russia, taking peaceable possession of Greece. These are important movements, and they indicate, as we have said, an extent of power that may justly be viewed as alarming. But it is not the mere possession of this power, portentous as it is, that we think the most formidable feature in the political aspect of Russia. There lies a deeper peril in the high intellectual and moral qualities, by which that power now appears to be directed. Mere brute force destroys itself by its own excesses, or may easily be parried by a skilful antagonist. It is only when enlightened by superior intelligence, and employed in the attainment of noble ends by noble means, that it really becomes irresistible. The sublime moderation of the Russian cabinet, the unexampled magnanimity of the Imperial family, the beautiful concord, the deep religious feeling that pervades all classes of the nation, these are 'signs of the times,' at which the statesmen of the West of Europe may well tremble; these are engines of aggrandisement, which, if they mean to resist, they must first imitate. 'I was not alarmed,' said a Greek philosopher, in whose presence Cicero had been declaiming, while on a visit at Athens, 'I was not alarmed at the progress of the Roman legions, but I now see that Greece is indeed conquered.' In this remark there was perhaps more professional prejudice than good sense; and a sounder reasoner might have argued, that in giving her arts to Rome, the city of Minerva had recovered, in some degree, the ascendancy which she yielded to the sword of Sylla. But what is excellence in art, considered as an instrument of power, when compared with superiority of intellect and morals? Music, poetry, and eloquence enchant the ear; painting, sculpture, and architecture ravish the eye; but wisdom and virtue are the 'stability of our times, and the fear of the Lord is our treasure.' The British stock-jobbers forget this, when they say that Russia has no finances. If the Western nations of Europe are at once outdone in force, and eclipsed in intellect and morals by their formidable Eastern neighbor, a mere superiority in the fine arts of life, should they retain it for awhile, will have no tendency to sustain their importance, or secure their national existence.
